



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF



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21 FEBRUARY 1966

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1. Dominican Republic

Preliminary analysis of the sweeping changes in local government officials decreed last Friday by Garcia Godoy strongly suggests that this was a maneuver to replace many Bosch partisans with followers of former president Balaguer. It does not seem, however, that the changes have been sufficiently extensive to eliminate entirely the edge enjoyed by the Bosch forces in the municipal and provincial governments.

Bosch called a sudden meeting of his party's executive committee for this afternoon. He may well challenge Garcia Godoy on the local government changes. He will perhaps also attack the compromise plan the president has been working on to solve his most immediate problem with the military chiefs.

There is as yet no word as to whether the recalcitrant army and air force chiefs have agreed to the compromise plan, under which they would be replaced but remain in the country to serve on an advisory general staff. The plan apparently has the backing of at least some military figures and seems to be the kind of "dignified" solution all could accept. Bosch, however, might well attack the plan as a "sellout."

2. Soviet Union

The USSR may be scheduling its first sea shipment of military equipment to North Vietnam. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

There is as yet no information on what kind of military equipment may be involved.

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3. South Vietnam

The South Vietnamese Communists have publicly admitted that a "number of our own comrades" have become discouraged over increased US military aggressiveness and new psychological warfare and pacification efforts in South Vietnam. The admission was in an article calling for a new "political struggle" and was published in the journal of the People's Revolutionary Party--the guiding group in the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

The argumentation seemed to reflect a feeling among the Communists that they must take steps to counter Saigon's recently announced programs of economic and social reform.

4. Indonesia

Sukarno has issued his challenge to the army. If he succeeds, as he appears so far to be doing, he will have re-established himself as the pre-eminent authority in Indonesia. He has replaced General Nasution as defense minister and abolished his other post as armed forces chief of staff. Nasution is widely regarded by all factions in the country as the leader of the army's anti-Communist campaign.

There were a number of other changes in the cabinet, which seem to constitute a significant shift to the left.

Army chief Suharto had strongly opposed Nasution's dismissal

It is a volatile situation but now that Sukarno's decision is both official and public it seems that the army may not contest it. The longer Suharto fails to act, the less likely it becomes he ever will. An account of Sukarno's efforts to reassert his severely damaged authority during the past six months is at Annex.

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5. Soviet Union

Moscow's new five-year plan, unveiled by the party plenum on Saturday, calls for a 40-percent increase in the national income by 1970. The planners expect to accomplish this largely through a rise of some 50 percent in industrial output and, apparently, a 25-percent increase in agricultural production over that of the last five years.

Judging by the official summary, which presumably puts it in its most favorable light, the new five-year plan is based generally on realistic projections of recent trends. However, it does contain some factors that make its complete accomplishment doubtful. In agriculture, for instance, great store is being set on the success of recent and largely untried worker incentive schemes.

There is little in the plan's summary to shed light on whether the hard decisions have been taken on how to split the country's limited resources among the major claimants--industry, agriculture, defense, and the consumer. Emphasis on consumer durables, however, does suggest that rapid growth in defense expenditures is not planned.

6. Italy

Premier-designate Moro is apparently to present his cabinet to the president tomorrow or Wednesday. The long crisis may be ending although few of the political factions involved are happy with the solution. The crisis has demonstrated once again the basic fragility of the center-left coalition.

7. France

De Gaulle's press conference today was one of his milder ones, at least the portions of direct interest to the US. He did not, however, change any of his fundamental positions.

His treatment of French plans regarding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization seemed aimed at creating a favorable climate for bilateral talks with the US regarding US forces and bases in France. He implied some flexibility in his approach by stating that he wanted to make the required changes "so they will not inconvenience France's allies."

The French president was surprisingly general in his references to Vietnam and avoided outright criticism of the US. His statements on the matter reflected his view that a negotiated settlement is not now a real possibility.

De Gaulle made his expected pitch for consultations among the Common Market countries without specifically calling for them himself.

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De Gaulle reserved his toughest language for Morocco and the Moroccan interior minister whom he charged with responsibility for the Ben Barka murder. Further deterioration in French-Moroccan relations is likely.

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8. Libya

Influential monarchists have gotten wind of the old King's plan to establish a republic and are making known their vehement opposition.

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republicanism seems to be becoming something of a magic remedy in the minds of progressive elements long frustrated by their inability to exercise significant political influence. Pressures from this source are likely to continue.

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ANNEX

Sukarno Versus the Army

Sukarno's recent gains toward re-establishing himself as the pre-eminent authority in Indonesia are due largely to his continuous maneuvering since the coup attempt on 1 October. This was not particularly difficult because the army--under General Suharto and Defense Minister Nasution--showed no desire to remove him or take over the government. Their objectives were to destroy the Communist Party, to reorient internal politics away from Communism, and to break Indonesia's attachment to Peking.

Nevertheless, Sukarno at first found himself badly tarnished by his implication in the plot and he was left on the sidelines while the army addressed itself to reversing the coup and destroying the Communists. In this situation, his main problem was that he had to operate without the support of the Communist Party and its crucial resources for agitation and propaganda.

Sukarno, however, has always acted on the premise that "he who would retain power must use it." Although his personal authority was badly eroded, he worked from the beginning to use and expand what he retained. Many of his initiatives did not prosper, but this did not stop him from making new attempts or repeating old ones.

Sukarno's first asset was his own political skill--no army figures or non-Communist political leader has even been any match for him. Then there was the increasingly obvious fact that the army did not plan to move against him. Finally, there was the realization that he was still accepted as the national leader by all elements of the population.

Another factor in his favor was the chaos brought on by the development of two administrative centers--Sukarno and the army--at a time when the army realized the necessity of re-establishing a unitary government.

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A brief catalogue of Sukarno's other maneuvers would include his continuing ability to purchase time by first offering and then delaying his "political solution;" his absolute refusal to ban the Communist Party; his launching of a "Sukarno Front" last month; and today his bold move of dismissing Nasution, the "political leader" of the army.

Sukarno assumed that time was on his side and that army momentum would slow as the urgency of the postcoup situation dissipated. The army had hoped to make the attempted coup a turning point in Indonesian history; Sukarno insisted that it was merely a "ripple in the revolution." Although there will still be more maneuvering, foot dragging, and temporary intransigence, Sukarno, if he gets away with his latest moves, will be well on his way again to closing the ranks of Indonesian society behind him.

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